While the Court's decision in Batson resolves many of the equal protection issues raised by the criticism of Swain, 7 it poses a host of new questions. Among the most important are: whether Batson should be applied retroactively; whether challenges should be abolished completely; 8 whether the rule in Batson should apply to defense counsel as well as prosecutors; and whether the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the sixth amendment as well as the equal protection clause.
This Note reviews the decision in Swain and the subsequent efforts of many state and federal courts to avoid the rule which it promulgated. Next, it provides a discussion of the Court's decision in Batson. The Note then examines the questions, outlined above, which the Court's decision in Batson poses. Finally, the Note concludes that the Court correctly decided Batson and recommends that the Court extend its holding to defense counsel as well as prosecutors.
II. THE ROAD TO BATSON
The Supreme Court first applied the fourteenth amendment to discriminatory jury selection in Strauder v. West Virginia. 9 In that case, the Court invalidated a West Virginia statute which limited both petit and grand jury service to white men. 10 The Court reasoned that such discrimination on the face of a statute "is practically a brand upon them [blacks] , affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." 1 1
While the question of statutory exclusion of blacks from jury venires, and thus from petit juries, engenders a relatively simple equal protection analysis, the exclusionary use of peremptory challenges is by no means as straightforward. " [B] oth prosecutors and defense counsel have come to rely on the peremptory to remove jurors they suspect of prejudice. By definition, the peremptory chal-lenge does not require an explanation." 12 The Court has long emphasized the importance of the peremptory challenge within the criminal justice system. "Although the Court has held that the peremptory is not a constitutional requirement, it always has been considered one of the most effective means of securing an impartial jury and of satisfying the defendant of that impartiality. "' 3 Because the peremptory challenge allows attorneys on both sides such untrammeled discretion, the potential for discriminatory abuse has always existed. The race, religion, or gender of a prospective juror has caused many attorneys to exercise a peremptory challenge on the theory that the prospective juror's race, religion, or gender will dispose him one way or the other toward the defendant. This belief conflicts with the basic objectives underlying the equal protection clause, in that the prosecutor, a representative of the state, consciously discriminates on the basis of race, religion, or gender. The Supreme Court finally resolved this conflict between the fourteenth amendment and the traditions behind the peremptory challenge when it decided Swain v. Alabama in 1965.
A. SWAIN V. ALABAMA
In Swain, an all-white jury convicted the petitioner, a black man, of rape. 14 The jury was selected from a venire drawn from the general population of Talladega County, Alabama. Black males constituted twenty-six percent of all males over twenty-one in the county. Between ten and fifteen percent of the members of the jury panels which produced grand and petit juries had been black during the period between 1953 and 1965. 15 In spite of these statistics, no black had served on a petit jury since approximately 1950. Thejury which convicted the petitioner in Swain was drawn from a venire containing eight blacks. Two of these jurors were exempt, and the prosecutor struck the other siX. 
Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 340 (1982) . The peremptory challenge serves as an important component of the jury selection process. After the attorneys have conducted the voir dire examination, they may exercise an unlimited number of challenges for cause. In order to remove ajuror for cause, however, an attorney must prove actual or implied bias, often an impossible task. In Part II of his majority opinion, Justice White provided a long description of the history and value of the peremptory challenge. He found that " [t] he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."' 17 Justice White concluded:
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause.... In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution ofjury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.18 Justice White also addressed the petitioner's argument that the prosecutor in Talladega County had systematically excluded blacks from all petit juries, not just the one in petitioner's case. He "agree [d] that this claim raises a different issue and it may well require a different answer."' 19 The Court, however, found the claim invalid because the record did not establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of blacks in the county. 20 The Court based its finding on the fact that the record did not indicate when blacks had been removed by the prosecution in Talladega County, when the defense had agreed to exclude blacks from the jury, and when blacks were removed for cause. The three dissenting Justices disputed the Court's finding that the record did not establish state involvement in the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries in Talladega County. Moreover, they contended that even if the record did not provide positive evidence of state involvement, the very fact that no black had ever served on a petit jury in the county established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, shifting the burden to the state to prove a nonracial reason for the exclusion.
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More importantly, however, the dissent agreed with the Court's conclusion that the systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury in a particular case does not overcome the presumption that the prosecutor did not base the exercise of his challenges on the race of the veniremen. In order to attain the benefits of this right, the court reasoned that the jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section of the 21 Id. at 226. 22 Id. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) and Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) Like the California tribunal, the Soares court found that the jury must be drawn from a cross-section of the community in order to satisfy the constitutional mandate for an impartial jury. 3 3 The Massachusetts court concluded "we view art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights as proscribing.., the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospectivejurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, defined groupings in the community. ' 34 The Florida Supreme Court adopted the Wheeler-Soares approach to circumvent Swain. 3 S. 961, 966 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) . Even more interestingly, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, agreed with Justice Marshall that the issue merited reconsideration but concurred in the denial of certiorari in order to allow the lower courts to provide further assistance in its resolution. 461 U.S. at 961-63 (Stevens, J., concurring). McCray next turned to the federal courts, seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges denied his sixth amendment rights. The district court granted the petition as to the sixth amendment, and further concluded, relying upon the opinions accompanying the denial of McCray's petition for certiorari Swain Court's reading of the equal protection clause. 4 2 After reviewing the Supreme Court's analysis of the sixth amendment, the court addressed the argument that the fair cross-section requirement, as delineated in Taylor, applied only to the selection of the venire, not to the selection of the petit jury from the venire. The court pointed out that the only reason for the venire's existence is to produce petit juries; therefore, if the sixth amendment requires that the venire be selected from a fair cross-section of the community, "[t]he necessary implication is that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant.., the chance that the petit jury will be similarly constituted.-43 After observing that Swain did not immunize peremptory challenges from sixth amendment scrutiny, 44 the court concluded "that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by an impartial jury . . . forbids the exercise of such challenges to excuse jurors solely on the basis of their racial affiliation" since such exclusion necessarily precludes completely any possibility that the jury will represent a fair cross-section of the community. The Sixth Circuit adopted the sixth amendment argument in Booker v. Jabe. 4 6 Like the Second Circuit, the Booker court was clearly dissatisfied with Swain, but refused to depart from its teaching with regard to the equal protection clause. 4 7 The court, however, did not end its analysis with the equal protection clause. The court in Booker pointed out that the Supreme Court decided Swain three years prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 48 which first applied the sixth amendment to state criminal proceedings. 4 9 The court observed that under current sixth amendment analysis, a jury must be "the product of selection methods that provide a fair possibility for obby the Supreme Court, that Swain was no longer good law with regard to the equal protection clause. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 Supp. , 1249 Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1983 In Batson, an all-white jury convicted the black petitioner of second-degree burglary and the receipt of stolen goods. The racial composition of the jury resulted from the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges to exclude from the petit jury all four of the black persons on the venire.
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The petitioner appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, urging the court to follow the decisions of other states, notably California 53 and Massachusetts, 54 "and to hold that such conduct violated his rights under the sixth amendment and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution 55 to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community." ' 56 The Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to follow Wheeler and Soares, noting that it had recently reaffirmed its subscription to the Swain rule. crimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." 5 9 He concluded that this basic principle applies as well to the selection of the petit jury from the venire.
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Justice Powell then analyzed Swain in terms of the evidentiary burden it established for a defendant seeking to demonstrate the state's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 61 He observed that under Swain a defendant must prove that the prosecutor trying his case had consistently excluded blacks from petit juries in a number of cases. 62 Justice Powell noted that this standard "has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof... [rendering] prosecutors' peremptory challenges . . largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 6 3
The Court next reviewed the development of the standards of proof in making a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jury venires and ascertained two distinct methods of doing so. Under both methods, the defendant must first prove "that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment."
64 Under the first method, the defendant must then show that members of his race have not been included in jury venires over an extended period. 6 5 The second method requires only that a defendant show "that members of the defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing 'the opportunity for discrimination.' "66 Thus, Justice Powell recognized that "since the decision in Swain, this Court has recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case." 6 7 He concluded that these same standards for establishing a prima facie case should apply with regard to the use of peremptory challenges.
68
Paralleling the standards used with regard to discriminatory se- 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
lection of the venire, the Court set out the evidentiary test for a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute ajury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. The Court pointed out that the determination of whether a defendant raises such an inference depends upon the circumstances surrounding the use of the peremptory challenge and the conduct of the voir dire examination. The Court acknowledged that it must rely upon the experience and discretion of trial judges to make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Justice Powell emphasized, however, that the inquiry does not end when the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a nonracial explanation for the use of his challenges. The Court "emphasize [d] that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." t 7 1 A prosecutor's explanation that he believed that a juror would favor another member of his own race is insufficient. 7 2 "Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive .... ,, 73 Justice Powell concluded his opinion by dismissing the state's arguments that judicial examination of prosecutorial motives during jury selection "will eviscerate the fair trial values served by the peremptory challenge" and "create serious administrative difficulties." 7 4 He pointed out that the jury system will be strengthened by the elimination of racial discrimination. As for the administrative burden, Justice Powell noted that no such problems had arisen in those states which had already adopted the Court's holding on state 76 Justice White, agreeing with the conclusions of the Court, observed that the continued widespread practice of eliminating blacks from petit juries forced the Court to allow inquiry into prosecutorial motives. 7 7 He emphasized that the prosecutor must be given the opportunity to provide trial-related reasons for his use of his peremptories. 78 Finally, Justice White made clear that he would not apply Batson retroactively.
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Justice Marshall also agreed with the Court's conclusions but argued that they should be extended further. He advocated the complete elimination of the system of peremptory challenges as the only way to end racial discrimination in the jury selection process. He supported this suggestion by noting that the system adopted by the Court, already practiced in several states as a matter of state law, had two severe limitations. First, "defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case."' 's Moreover, even when a prima facie case is made, prosecutors, Justice Marshall wrote, have no difficulty fabricating a racially neutral explanation. 8 2 Justice Marshall concluded by stating that he does not agree with suggestions that the challenge be preserved for defendants while being removed from the prosecution on the ground that "[o]ur criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his 75 Id. 76 Justices Stevens and O'Connor also filed concurring opinions. Justice Stevens addressed arguments in Chief Justice Burger's dissent that the petitioner had not presented the equal protection question in his petition for certiorari and that the question had not been properly briefed and argued. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens,J., concurring 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986 ))(emphasis in original).
88 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1737-38 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger argued that the state interest in the system of peremptory challenges is "substantial, if not compelling." Id. at 1738 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Under standard equal protection analysis, the Court applies "most rigid scrutiny" to facially discriminatory state actions, but such actions will nevertheless be upheld if they are deemed necessary to achieve a compelling state objective. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) .
89 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1741 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1744 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
cause they may also be used to strike whites, Hispanics, and Asians in cases involving defendants of those races. 9 1 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court's departure from the Swain standard is not justified by "anything in the Equal Protection Clause, or any other constitutional provision ..
"92

IV. ISSUES RAISED BY THE DECISION IN BATSON
The Court's withdrawal from the permissive standards of Swain raises several new issues with regard to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Foremost among these are: (1) Does the Court's decision in Batson apply retroactively to criminal convictions which became final before it was announced?; (2) should the Court go beyond Batson and abolish peremptory challenges completely?; (3) should Batson apply to defense counsel as well as prosecutors?; and (4) does the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violate the sixth amendment? This section will examine each of these questions in turn.
A. DOES BATSON APPLY RETROACTIVELY?
Four of the nine Justices stated that the Batson decision should not be applied retroactively. 9 3 The Court specifically reached this conclusion, at least with regard to convictions made final prior to the decision in Batson, in Allen v. Hardy. 9 4 The Court in Allen listed three factors traditionally considered in deciding whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure should apply retroactively:
" '(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.' "5 Applying these factors to the rule in Batson, the Allen Court found that the new standards did not exclusively bear upon the jury's truthfinding function but served multiple objectives. Because 91 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 92 Id. at 1745 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 93 Id. at 1726 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., concurring); and id. at 1741 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
94 106 S. Ct. 2878 Ct. (1986 . The Allen Court, speaking in a per curiam opinion, "express[ed] no view on the question whether our decision in Batson should be applied to cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time our decision was announced." Id. at 2880 n.1. The Court has since granted certiorari and heard oral argument on two cases presenting this question. it joins other mechanisms designed to ensure neutral factfinding, the Court noted that it could not "say that the new rule has such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel retroactive application." 96 Moreover, the Court found that Batson directly overruled Swain and "that prosecutors, trial judges, and appellate courts throughout our state and federal systems justifiably have relied on the standard of Swain." ' 97 This fact also mitigated against retroactive application. Finally, the Court found that retroactive application could create a potentially enormous burden on the administration of justice. Under Swain, prosecutors had no cause to develop an explanation for the use of their peremptory challenges. As a result, the evidentiary difficulties on retrial, years after the original conviction, would be mind-boggling. 9 8 For these reasons, the Court concluded that Batson should not apply retroactively. 9 9
B. SHOULD PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BE ABOLISHED COMPLETELY?
Justice Marshall argued in Batson that the equal protection clause requires that the system of peremptory challenges be abolished, given the potential for discriminatory abuse which even the new standards of Batson cannot completely eradicate.' 00 The Batson majority specifically rejected this view. The Court did not "think that this historic trial practice, which long has served the selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of an apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution."' 0 '1 Justice Marshall therefore stands alone in his total opposition to the system of peremptory challenges.' 0 2 Support for the abolition of peremptory challenges appears to be equally sparse among commentators. Even those commentators who have called for total abolition to remedy the problems of abuse have done so with some reservation. One of the most frequently cited articles favoring abolition offered a caveat to its argument, stating that peremptory challenges should be abolished " [u] Defenders of the peremptory challenge have forcefully presented cogent reasons for maintaining the practice:
Peremptory challenges serve to remove those jurors whose neutrality parties suspect, when the parties cannot prove partiality with enough certainty to justify a challenge for cause. In addition, they protect the exercise of the challenge for cause by allowing a party to remove a juror whom he has alienated through extensive voir dire aimed at identifying possible biases. The peremptory also seeks to insure that a party has a good opinion of the jury by allowing him to remove anyone he intuitively dislikes.
10 6
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should not abandon the peremptory challenge. The new standards adopted in Batson should greatly reduce the potential for discriminatory abuse by requiring prosecutors to justify the use of their peremptory challenges to eliminate all members of a discrete and insular minority from the venire in a particular case. The value of the peremptory challenge as a means of ensuring the selection of ajury satisfactory to both the defendant and the state should preclude its elimination. Even if one accepts Justice Marshall's premise that peremptory challenges are inherently prone to abuse whatever the safeguards, the cost of abolition to both the defendant and the state 0 7 is too high to justify the rulings on the question, because the state constitutional grounds which formed their basis are similar to the sixth amendment.
The foregoing authorities establish a reciprocal right of prosecutors to challenge the improper use of peremptory challenges by defense counsel under the sixth amendment. It is, however, by no means a foregone conclusion that the Supreme Court will reach such a result in the wake of Batson, given that the Court grounded its decision there in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the sixth amendment.
In order to establish a violation of the equal protection clause, one must show that the challenged action is a "state action." ' 1 4 The improper use of peremptory challenges by the prosecutor is a state action because the prosecutor embodies and represents the state in a criminal proceeding. The same may not be said, however, with regard to defense counsel. Even when defense counsel is a public defender employed by the state, he "does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." ' 1 15 The equal protection clause does not prohibit defense counsel from using their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion. Nevertheless, it does not seem possible, " [o] nce the Court has held that prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory challenges, [to] ... rationally hold that defendants are not. ' "116 General notions of fairness dictate that defense counsel not be allowed to use discriminatory practices forbidden to prosecutors. Because the equal protection clause does not prevent such a result, in order to prevent it the Court must turn to the sixth amendment. The Court has historically viewed the impartiality of the jury to require that " [b] etween [the defendant] and the state the scales are to be evenly held." 1 17 114 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883) . 115 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) . The issue in Dodson was raised when a defendant convicted of robbery brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to overturn his conviction on the ground that the public defender assigned to his case had not adequately represented him. Thus, the question was whether the public defender had acted "under color of state law" for the purposes of a § 1983 suit. The Supreme Court has held that "[i]n cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) . See also Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U. S. 325, 328 n.6 (1983) .
116 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1738 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In fact, "every jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter, and prohibited prosecution casespecific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable group affiliation, has held that the defendant must likewise be so prohibited." United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986 )(en banc).
117 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) .
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Surely, nothing could be so uneven as binding the prosecution to the Batson standards while allowing the defense to use his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. In order to extend to defense counsel the requirements set down in Batson, the Court must first decide whether the systematic exclusion of minorities from petit juries in particular cases violates the fair cross-section component of the sixth amendment.
D. DOES THE DISCRIMINATORY EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN A PARTICULAR CASE VIOLATE THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT?
As with the question of the applicability of their decision to defense counsel, the Batson Court "express [ed] no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments." 118 Both the state" 9 and the federal 120 arguments in favor of applying the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges were outlined above. The arguments against a sixth amendment rationale supporting the result in Batson should ultimately be rejected. The cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment should preclude both prosecutors and defense counsel from exercising their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges precludes the possibility that the jury will represent a fair cross-section of the community, because such use, by design, eliminates a significant segment of the community. 12 1 The Court's decision in Batson under the equal protection clause renders the point moot with regard to prosecutors, but sixth amendment analysis is essential with regard to defense counsel.
Three basic rationales have been offered to support the contention that the fair cross-section requirement does not forbid the exclusionary exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case:
118 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716 n.4. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, earlier spoke favorably of the sixth amendment argument in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983) .
119 See supra text accompanying notes 25-38 for an examination of state supreme court cases which relied on both state constitutional requirements and the sixth amendment (as interpreted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522) to avoid the rule in Swain. See also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) .
120 See supra text accompanying notes 39-51 for a review of the decisions of the Second and Sixth Circuits holding that the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment forbids the use of peremptory challenges in order to exclude minorities from criminal petit juries in particular cases. ment. Thus, the Court in Batson presumably already considered and rejected this criticism. Finally, the third criticism reflects a concern for the administrative difficulty within the criminal justice system of applying the fair cross-section requirement to the use of peremptory challenges. Again, this criticism applies equally to the rule announced in Batson, where the majority explicitly rejected the argument, observing that "[i]n those states applying a version' of the evidentiary standard we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens, and the peremptory challenge system has survived."' 127 Thus, the Court's decision in Batson apparently precludes the bulk of the criticism directed against application of the fair crosssection requirement of the sixth amendment to the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. This criticism goes more to the practical problems raised by the evidentiary standards announced by the Court than to the constitutional rationale for requiring those standards. Problems, such as the identity of protected groups and the administrative burden on the judicial system, arise whether the new standard is grounded in the fourteenth or sixth amendment. The court of appeals cases attacking the sixth amendment approach confirmed this conclusion by relying almost exclusively upon Swain, an equal protection case, in rejecting the sixth amendment argument. They refused to consider the sixth amendment rationale on its own merits, holding that Swain precluded its application. As one court concluded:
[W]e are not convinced that Taylor and its sixth amendment analysis have in effect overruled Swain and now restrict the government's use of the peremptory challenge to remove black prospective jurors. This does not mean that we entirely disapprove of the ... analysis, rather we believe that any attack upon the government's use of the peremptory challenge must squarely confront Swain.... The Supreme Court has not reconsidered Swain and until that time, of course, we must follow Swain.1
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With the removal of the roadblock of Swain, the argument against a sixth amendment approach to the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case loses much of its force. The requirement that both the state and the defendant have an opportunity for a trial before a petit jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community is not satisfied if either side may exercise its peremp- 
